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Abstract — The commodity nature of green coffee is 
the main cause of “the coffee paradox” (decreasing 
prices at production level and rising prices at 
consumption level). So, a requirement to reach a less 
unfair distribution of the added value between the 
supply chain would be to “decommodify” the coffee 
market not only at the final consumer level, but also at 
the production level. Certifications (like Fair Trade, 
Organic, Rainforest Alliance, Utz Kapeh, or Bird-
friend) are often presented as a way to reach this result, 
but according to some authors these schemes seem to be 
rather an extension of the standardization wave to new 
quality attributes (linked to social and/or environmental 
characteristics of the production process). Geographical 
indications (GIs) seems to be very different in this 
respect. GIs’ Codes of practices (which include the 
delimitation of the production area and a description of 
the production norms and product quality) are normally 
elaborated by the local actors themselves , who are able 
to define the link to the terroir (physical and anthropic 
characteristics of the production area ). The aim of this 
article is to question the ability of GIs to “decommodify” 
the coffee market also on the production side, and 
contribute to a fair distribution of the benefits of 
decommodification. The paper is based on the analysis 
of the design process of a GI coffee in the Jarabacoa 
region (Dominican Republic), which led to a very 
selective Code of practices but not so specific with 
regard to the link with the territory. The article 
evidences the chain of causality that brought to such a 
result, and debates to what extent the case can be 
considered as context-specific. Given that it appeared 
that most of the determinants are generic to the coffee 
world, the relevance of GIs as a tool to “decommodify” 
the coffee market must be qualified.  
Keywords— Coffee; Geographical Indications; 
Collective action. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A commodity is a standardized good with a 
homogeneous quality. Decommodifying a market means to 
differentiate the product in order to reduce the 
substitutability between the suppliers and, by so doing, to 
improve the share of the added value captured by the 
suppliers. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the international 
market for green coffee was highly decommodified. Indeed, 
the coffee of each farm used to be sold separately in auction 
markets in London, which gave an important role to the 
reputation of single farms [1]. Although this “old” system 
has not completely disappeared (there is a small niche 
market for “estate coffees”, or coffees coming from specific 
farms), with the development of future markets and the 
emergence of family farms producing coffee before the 
World War II, the organization of the market completely 
changed [2]. Green coffee is now a commodity classified 
according to a few criteria. The coffee variety (Arabica 
versus Robusta) and the type of post-harvest process 
(washed versus unwashed coffees) determine the three most 
important coffee classifications: washed Arabica, unwashed 
Arabica, and Robusta. In each of these big categories, the 
coffee is classified according to the country of origin and 
the grade (bean size and number of defects). The 
commodification of the market is completed by the know-
how of the roasters, who know how to substitute a grade 
from a specific country by another grade from elsewhere, 
changing the percentages in their blends. 
 Recently (and in particular after the collapse of the 
International coffee agreement in 1989), the 
standardisation of the coffee market was often 
presented as a problem. Indeed, the commodity nature 
of green coffee is viewed to be the main cause of “the 
coffee paradox”, characterised by decreasing prices at 
the level of production and rising prices at the level of 
consumption [1].According to Daviron and Ponte [1], 
the economic value of coffee is not generated by the 
raw material (green coffee), but rather by the ways of 
combining different coffees in blend, of roasting them, 
of marketing them (symbolic attributes), and by the 
services offered in bars and coffee shops. Firms in 
downstream stages of the supply chain (normally 
operating in big consumer countries) are able to satisfy 
the changing consumer needs (adding value to the 
final product) without involving upstream firms. 
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Therefore, a way to reach a less unfair distribution 
of the added value inside the supply chain would be to 
creating a direct link between the 
“decommodification” now advanced on the final 
coffee market (characterised by the growing demand 
for speciality coffees) and the producers’ market. 
Certifications of particular process and/or product 
attributes are often presented as a way to create this 
link and, by so doing, to differentiate or 
“decommodify” the coffee market [3] [4]. Indeed, 
many types of certifications now exist for coffee and 
are growing rapidly: Fair Trade, Organic, Rainforest 
Alliance, Utz Kapeh, Starbucks, Shade grown, Bird-
friendly… However, the impact of these certifications 
on the “decommodification” of the coffee market on 
the production side is doubtful. Indeed, the Code of 
practices (standards) of all these certification schemes 
have been designed by the downstream part of the 
coffee chain (either by buyers -like Starbucks- or 
institutions not involved in the trade -like Flo 
International-), and are the same all over the world. 
Consequently, the development of the certifications 
may be interpreted as a simple extension of the 
standardization to new attributes (linked to the social 
and/or environmental characteristics of the production 
process). Anyway, the increasing interest of the coffee 
growers in these new market macro-segments increase 
the internal competition and lower economic returns 
for coffee growers, who at the same time have to bear 
increased production costs [5]. Moreover, the entry of 
big multinational players and of big supermarkets 
chains into these market segments lowered the prices 
of the certified coffee at the consumption stage. 
The case of geographical indications (GIs) seems 
very different. According to the TRIPS Agreement 
(1994), GIs are “indications which identify a good as 
originating in a territory […] where a given quality, 
reputation or other characteristic of the good is 
essentially attributable to its geographical origin” (Art. 
22.1). The recognition of a GI establishes a collective 
intellectual property right over the geographical name 
of the product, allowing only producers respecting the 
link of the product with its geographical origin to use 
the geographical name on the product. These 
characteristics seems to give to GIs a high potential of 
decommodification (compared to others 
certifications). Indeed, the recognition of a GI is 
usually based on a codification of the delimitation of 
the production area and of some production norms and 
product characteristics, defining in this way specific 
(unique) products. Moreover, the Code of practices is 
normally elaborated by the actors belonging to the 
local production system (firms of different stages of 
the supply chain and other stakeholders, with the 
support of local public administrations and 
development agencies). The collective and local 
dimension in the definition of the rules, the possibility 
of making rules linked to a specific context 
(geographical and anthropic), and the specificity and 
uniqueness of the related product qualities may offer 
some important opportunities to GIs with regard to 
other process and/or product attributes certification 
schemes. At the same time, they pose some problems 
in the constitution process and in establishing an 
effective link with the consumers [6] [7]. 
As a matter of fact, GIs are developing rapidly in 
the coffee world [8] [9], and many expectations are 
entrusted in this tool even if its effectiveness is 
discussed [10].  
The aim of the article is to question the ability of 
GIs to “decommodify” the coffee market on the 
production side. In other words, the aim isto question 
the GIs potential to transfer benefits coming from the 
decommodification of the final consumption to the 
coffee growers side, which relies on two main 
elements: effectiveness and fairness. We will say that 
a GI is effective if it is able to generate a surplus for 
the local system through differentiation, due to the 
remuneration of the specific qualities.  
A GI is fair if the distribution of this surplus 
satisfies some criteria of justice. Due to the central 
position of Rawls’ theory in the debate on justice, we 
choose to  use Rawls criteria to check the GI fairness 
[11]. The “fair equality of opportunity principle” says 
that two people endowed with the same talent should 
have the same possibilities to accessing the different 
social positions. In the case of GIs, we can consider 
that the “social position” is the right to use the GI and 
that the “talent” of the agents is linked to their 
potential for quality/typicity and to their legitimacy to 
use the protected GI. The “difference principle” states 
that the differences in advantages coming from the 
different social positions should benefit to the more 
disadvantaged people. In the case of GIs, this means 
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that the poorest farmers should be included in the GI, 
or benefit from the GI without necessarily being 
included in it (positive externalities).  
II. METHODOLOGY AND AIMS  
The paper is based on an in-depth analysis of the 
design process of a coffee GI in Dominican Republic: 
the GI “Pico Duarte coffee”. So far, an ex-post 
evaluation of the results of this GI is not possible, 
because of the recent birth of this initiative. At the 
same time, it is very important to identify critical 
points, opportunities and limits of the GI tool, 
considering the lack of empirical evidences, the high 
number of on-going GI initiatives around the world, 
and the interest for a definition of effective public 
supporting policies. 
Moreover, the achievement of the potential of GIs 
for decommodification depends a lot on the GI design 
process which specifies the rules of the GI. So, in 
order to identify the factors that can undermine the 
“decommodifier” role of GIs, we have to focus on the 
decision-making process of GI’s Code of practices 
(delimitated area and norms). 
Concerning Pico Duarte coffee, it was possible to 
access to very good data about what occurred inside 
the decision-making process: minutes of the meetings 
of the team that defined the rules of the negotiation 
game, slides presented during the negotiation game 
including the possible options to be discussed and 
information about their advantages and drawbacks, the 
paperboards with the first best and second best 
expressed by the groups of stakeholders (producers, 
traders, institutions), and direct interviews with 
different participants. 
The Pico Duarte GI initiative was launched in 2006 
to solve the problem of lack of incentives for quality 
(adverse selection phenomenon) in the coffee system 
in the region of Jarabacoa, localized in the north slope 
of the main mountains chain of the Dominican 
Republic (Cordillera Central). Supported and oriented 
by the Dominican Government and by external 
cooperation agencies (USAID and Agence Française 
pour le Développement), the GI design process came 
out into a Code of practices oriented by principles and 
criteria that are not endogenous to the local system and 
not specific to local coffee territorial specificity. 
Moreover, the process brought to a very small 
production area, and to very exclusive production 
norms and green coffee quality requisites. For these 
reasons, as we will see, the outcome of this collective 
decision-making process can be viewed as ineffective 
and unfair.  
The aim of the article is to evidence the chain of 
causality that has produced such a result, to identity 
the structural factors that cause it, and to discuss to 
what extent these factors can be considered specific to 
this case study or can be generalized.  
We will first present the initial situation and the 
birth of the GI initiative. Then, we will present the two 
rounds of negotiation and their result. Finally, we will 
discuss the chain of causality and its possible 
generalization to other coffee GIs before discussing 
some lessons drawing from the case study and 
concluding on the relevance of GIs as a tool to 
“decommodify” the coffee market.  
III. INITIAL SITUATION AND BIRTH OF THE GI 
INITIATIVE 
The Jarabacoa coffee system is representative of the 
many coffee systems all over the world.  
First, it is characterized by a dual production 
structure, with the coexistence of small family-farms 
and big capitalist farms (almost always localized in the 
highest areas which are more favourable for producing 
quality coffees, using intensive practices, specialised 
on coffee production, and with access to the 
international market). In the case of Jarabacoa region, 
according to the Geocafé project data base 
(http://edcintl.cr.usgs.gov/geocafe/index.php), the 
capitalist farms represent 4% of the farms, own 52% 
of the coffee cultivated land, and produce 67% of the 
coffee.  
Second, another important characteristic is the 
marginalisation of the lower areas. This evolution is 
classical in the coffee world, because the lowest areas 
are less adapted for producing good quality coffee and 
have more production alternatives. In the case of 
Jarabacoa, a chronologic comparison of the different 
sources of data shows that the number of coffee farms 
below 700 m has been divided by four since 2001. 
However, it is important to note that part of this 
evolution is due to a change in the definition of what is 
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a coffee producer in statistical sources: the small and 
diversified producers of the lower areas are also 
marginalised in the mind of coffee experts.  
The third characteristic of the Jarabacoa coffee 
system (which is also common to many coffee systems 
in the world) is the high concentration of activities at 
the downstream level of the local market chain. In the 
case of the Jarabacoa region, the structure of the local 
market chain can be characterized as duopsonistic. 
Indeed, the main coffee firm of the zone is producing 
in his own farms about 30% of the coffee of the zone, 
and trading about 60% of it. All the others traders in 
the area (around 35) are working to supply the main 
roaster of Dominican Republic, who is proposing the 
same price without making any quality differentiation. 
Last but not least, producers’ loyalty towards buyers is 
widespread. This is also a very common situation in 
the coffee world: the personal relationships with the 
same buyer allow the producers to access to credit 
from the coffee buyer. But, as the producer has to 
repay his/her debt, he/she has not the opportunity to 
arbitrate between different buyers. In the Jarabacoa 
region, according to Geocafé data, 60% of the 
producers never change their trader.  
Performances are also similar to many coffee 
production systems in the world. Apart from little 
quantities exported at high prices by some big 
producers (as estate coffees), the main part of the 
exported coffee is sold in the bulk market at low 
prices. As this coffee is consumed as blends, external 
consumers (both roasters and final consumers) do not 
know the name of the region or the country of 
production. In the case of Jarabacoa, around 80% of 
the exported coffee is sold to Italy at a (low) premium 
of 7 US $ / QQ (according to Codocafé database) 
which represent an average premium of only 7%..As 
more than 80% of the exported coffee from Jarabacoa 
is exported using the name of another (more reputed) 
production zone of Dominican Republic, even the 
roasters do not know the name of Jarabacoa.  
The situation is quite similar in the domestic 
market, where coffee is paid at a price closed to 80% 
of the price of the “C contract” of the New York 
Board of Trade (whatever its quality). Part of the 
coffee is blended with others Dominican coffees and 
sold with the registered trademark Café Santo 
Domingo without any mention of the production 
zones. Another part is roasted and sold as pure origin 
through the trademark Café Monte Alto. However, the 
name of Jarabacoa is not put in evidence on the 
package and Dominican people usually do not know 
that this coffee comes from Jarabacoa.   
The birth of the GI initiative is a result of two 
events: the creation of the Cluster Café de Jarabacoa 
(CCJ) and a study on coffee quality in Dominican 
Republic that evidenced the high quality potential of 
the Jarabacoa region and some other neighbouring 
production areas such as Constanza and Juncalito.  
The Cluster de café de Jarabacoa (CCJ) was created 
in May 2005. The setting-up of the Cluster had 
nothing to do neither with the GI, nor with the 
identification of some common objectives by local 
actors. It was rather a process activated and funded by 
external actors (USAID) who chose the coffee sector 
in the region of Jarabacoa almost by accident (good 
relationships between a coffee producer of the zone 
and the USAID).  
The idea of the GI initiative came from the project 
PROCA2 funded by AFD, the aim of which is to help 
the Dominican coffee supply chain to improve the 
quality and the product promotion to get higher 
premiums on the international market. The implicit 
idea of the project was to develop origin-based quality 
signs (GIs). PROCA2 ordered a study to IDIAF 
(Dominican research institute on agriculture) with the 
objective to identifying and delimitating the different 
zones with potential for quality, and to characterize the 
specific potential quality attributes of the coffee in 
each zone. The study was performed by IDIAF with 
the help of CIRAD (a French research institute on 
tropical agriculture) during the harvests 2003-2004 
and 2004-2005. The methodology of the study 
mobilized many scientific data: soil maps, topographic 
maps at scale 1:50000, empirical knowledge of the 
local coffee technicians, altimeters, analysis of 
samples of soil, analysis of samples of coffee 
harvested and processed following the norms of coffee 
manuals. The cup tasting and chemical analysis were 
also performed using international norms: ISO norm 
6668:1991 for roasting and tasting, ISO norm 11294 
for Near Infrared Spectrometry, and ISO norm 10095 
for High-Performance Liquid Chromatography. The 
main result of this study was that the best zone for 
coffee quality is the north slope of the Cordillera 
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Central (included Jarabacoa but also the neighbouring 
zones of Constanza and Juncalito). However, the high 
acidity and the fruity, two of the most important and 
asked coffee quality attributes, did not appear in the 
lower areas (below 700-800 m).  
As the study revealed a gap between the potential 
and the effective level of quality of the coffee from 
Jarabacoa, it gave the idea to the Cluster to develop a 
geographical indication. Therefore, the GI was 
conceived as a standard able to achieve two results at 
the same time: give a good process and production 
quality standard for local producers, and gain an extra 
price on the market. In this way the vicious circle “low 
prices-low quality-low prices" could be interrupted. 
At the beginning, the name chosen by local actors 
for the GI was “Café de Jarabacoa”, but this name was 
already registered by a private firm (this is allowed by 
the Dominican law, and many geographical names are 
registered as private coffee trademarks). That is why, 
after the second round of negotiation, the name turned 
into “Pico Duarte coffee”, where Pico Duarte is the 
name of the highest mountain in the Cordillera Central 
and in all the Caribbean region. Indeed, Pico Duarte 
could be an identitary name even for other coffee areas 
in the Cordillera central such as the already mentioned 
neighbouring regions of Juncalito and Constanza. 
  
IV. THE ACTORS OF THE JARABACOA COFFEE 
SYSTEM AND THEIR EXPECTATIONS ON THE 
GI  
The GI initiative launched by the Cluster 
encountered a generalized good interest in the 
Jarabacoa coffee system.  
The expectation from the GI was an increase of 
revenues by means of higher prices, expected from 
three different mechanisms: higher quality standards 
reached by the local system; more homogeneous 
characteristics of the coffee lots; and identification of 
local coffee as specialty/origin coffee on intermediate 
markets and/or consumers markets. 
Due to the heterogeneous structure of the local 
system and to power unbalances, the different local 
actors put different expectations from the GI. 
In particular, coffee producers and their co-
operatives were interested in diversifying the 
marketing channels, opening new commercial 
opportunities to escaping to the internal monopsony. 
But even within the farmers a high differentiation can 
be observed. Some of them are located inside the 
borders of the Municipio de Jarabacoa, whereas others 
have their farm in the neighbouring zones of Juncalito 
and Constanza. The farms have different quality 
potential according to their altitude: low (below 700-
800 m), medium (between 700-800 m and 1000 m), or 
high (above 1000 m). The big and some medium 
coffee producers use intensive production practices 
that are good for reaching higher coffee quality, or can 
adopt them without bearing prohibitive costs. For 
other farmers, it would be very difficult to comply 
with very restrictive norms needed to reach high-
quality levels. Obviously, each category of producers 
has interest to be included in the GI. The question is to 
know whether the others have interest to include them 
or not. For example, the producers from the highest 
part of the mountains have interest to exclude those 
from the lowest part who cannot produce a coffee with 
special flavours. Their inclusion can be seen as a 
menace for reaching high quality coffees and 
consequently for the reputation of the new GI. 
Local processors and traders oriented to new 
“decommodified” coffee markets are interested in the 
standardisation of the local coffee production on 
higher quality levels, in order to reduce transaction, 
control, and coordination costs. The local Fair Trade 
certified producers’ organisation (localized near the 
region of Jarabacoa) is not interested by linking coffee 
to territorial origin, and perceive the GI as a threat.  
The expected effects from the GI are different 
depending on different actors: processors are mainly 
interested in effects internal to the supply chain (high 
quality and more homogeneous lots of green coffee), 
producers and their co-operatives and associations are 
mainly interested in effects on the external market (GI 
is conceived as a marketing tool able to create a good 
reputation for the name of the coffee and new demand 
of specialty markets). 
Local public institutions (in principle) and coffee 
producers as well are interested also in keeping coffee 
cultivation, not only for economic reasons but also for 
environmental issues as water, soil fertility, and 
biodiversity. The support to coffee was viewed also as 
a means for poverty alleviation. 
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According to the nature of the property right 
(collective, because linked to a geographical name) 
and to the procedure defined by the national 
Dominican law, a definition of collective rules (Code 
of practices) for the GI was needed. Then, a decision-
making process began, the aim of which was to design 
the GI Pico Duarte Code of practices which included 
the definition of the production area, the production 
norms, and quality classification norms. 
V. THE FIRST ROUND OF NEGOTIATION 
The first round took place on September 2006 in 
Jarabacoa. The process can be divided in two steps: 
the definition of the rules of the game (or the meta-
game) and the negotiation game itself.  
A.  The definition of the rules of the game  
As it was the initiator of the GI process, the Cluster 
had the responsibility and the legitimacy to define the 
rules of the game of the collective negotiation. 
However, the IDIAF-CIRAD-CNEARC-PROCA2 
team (now called “the Team”) was perceived to hold 
the scientific knowledge (on GIs, on coffee quality, 
and on coffee production and marketing systems). For 
that reason, this team was charged by the Cluster to 
define the options regarding the contents of the Code 
of Practices and to produce and give some information 
on their respective advantages and drawbacks. In 
practice, the Team went beyond its mandate because 
he also proposed to the Cluster a list of persons to be 
invited to participate to the game and a way to 
organise the collective decision-making process.  
This Team was formed by researchers. It was 
guided by the will to be simple and neutral. However, 
the minutes of their internal discussions showed that 
they were all in favour of including the neighbouring 
zones of Juncalito and Constanza, which would have 
brought to an enlargement of the geographical area 
outside Jarabacoa region. Indeed, a big GI including 
all the North Slope of the Cordillera Central was 
perceived to be at the same time more inclusive and 
more efficient (more consistency with scientific data 
on coffee quality, more exportable quantities, and, by 
so doing, higher economies of scale on monitoring, 
control, and promotion).  
On the other hand, the Team had expressed less 
clear preferences concerning the production norms 
(coffee cultivation techniques, despulping, drying, 
etc.) and the “vertical” dimension of the area 
(minimum level of altitude) because of the trade-off 
between the level of exclusion and the probability of 
success of the reputation building strategy (high 
altitude and strict production norms increase the 
probability of occurrence and the intensity of the fruity 
attribute). In order to avoid a complicated debate on a 
very technical question, the Team decided not to 
include the classification norms in the debate. A 
possible option would have been to propose smaller 
zones than the municipality of Jarabacoa, what would 
have been consistent with the fact that many producers 
identified themselves and their coffee with micro-
zones [12]. But this would have weakened the option 
of the big zone because the option of the municipality 
of Jarabacoa would have appeared as an in-between 
option. Finally, the four options were presented for the 
delimitated area, crossing two scenarios for the 
horizontal dimension of the GI area (Jarabacoa versus 
Jarabacoa + Constanza + Juncalito) with two scenarios 
for the vertical dimension of the GI area (all ranks of 
altitude versus > 700-800 m). The threshold of 700-
800 m came from the study on coffee quality potential 
which showed that in the north slope of the Cordillera 
Central, the fruity attribute almost never appear under 
this level of altitude. Besides the four options affecting 
the geographical boundaries, two other options were 
presented for the production norms: option A with few 
restrictive norms (especially on the aspects for which 
the gap between “good” and real practices is high) and 
option B with more restrictive norms (in order to 
guarantee a higher quality level).  
In relation to the information given to the players on 
advantages and drawbacks of the proposed options, 
the Team’s presentation stressed some advantages of 
including the neighbouring zones of Juncalito and 
Constanza. The first argument was linked to the 
similarity of the coffee of the three zones. This 
information (based on scientific data) was presented in 
the form of a map (see figure 1).  
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Figure 1: The similarity of the zones of Juncalito, Jarabacoa 
and Constanza for coffee typicity 
¿IG Jarabacoa_Tipicidad?
 
Note: fruity flavor is represented by the red points 
Source: Extract of the Team’s presentation during the first round 
The second argument was based on the increase of 
the number of coffee producers and hectares if the 
neighbouring zones were included. It was presented in 
the form of a graph (see table 1). Besides, the final 
slide of the presentation underlined the economies in 
costs of traceability, promotion, and control that a 
wider area would permit to reach. 
Table 1: Number of coffee producers and hectares in the 
four scenarios related to the definition of the geographical 
boundaries 
 Jarabacoa + Juncalito + 
Constanza 
Jarabacoa 
All ranks of 
altitude 
Nb of coffee producers: 3400 
Nb oh hectares: 6250 
Nb of coffee 
producers: 700 
Nb oh hectares: 2000 
> 700 – 800 
m 
Nb of coffee producers: 1600 
Nb oh hectares: 5000 
Nb of coffee 
producers: 550 
Nb oh hectares: 1875 
Source of the data: Team’s presentation during the first round 
The Team also made some proposals regarding the 
players (who should participate to the negotiation 
game) and the organization of the decision-making 
process. However, as the Team did not have any 
mandate on these aspects, its proposals were discussed 
with the Directive Board of the Cluster and modified. 
The proposal of the Team was to invite also actors 
coming from outside the municipality of Jarabacoa 
(producers from the region of Jarabacoa, Juncalito or 
Constanza and traders from all the country). In relation 
to the organization of the collective decision, the 
proposal was a three steps process with i) a plenary 
session where the PROCA2-IDIAF team would give 
information about the options and their advantages and 
drawbacks, ii) a session articulated into three groups 
(producers, traders, institutions) in order to identify the 
preferences (first and second choices) of each group, 
and iii) another plenary session of restitution of the 
works by the different groups and of collective debate.  
Those proposals were submitted to the Directive 
Board of the Cluster. The Cluster should logically 
prefer to restrict the delimitated area to the 
municipality of Jarabacoa (its legitimate area of 
intervention) in order to keep the control of the GI. 
Moreover, it should logically do not care a lot about 
the producers of the lowest zones because they are bad 
represented and little involved in the Cluster. The 
members of the Cluster’s Directive Board (one 
representative of the biggest coffee firm of the 
Jarabacoa region and six representatives of the 
producers) have also their own preferences. How did 
they react to the Team’s proposals regarding the 
players and the organization of the decision making 
process? Initially the biggest coffee firm of the 
Jarabacoa region was against the presence of actors 
from outside the municipality of Jarabacoa. The 
negotiation leads to a compromise: to invite producers 
from the neighbouring zone of Juncalito and 
Constanza, but no traders. However, the letter of 
invitation sent by the Cluster was insisting a lot on 
coffee from Jarabacoa without explaining that the 
initiative was opened to the neighbouring zones1. 
Moreover, all those actors were invited only for the 
debate (in the morning), while the final decisions 
should be taken by the Cluster in a fourth step (in the 
afternoon). The three steps process proposed by the 
Team was accepted. The Cluster’s Directive Board 
only added some elements in the first step especially a 
presentation of the Cluster with its objectives and its 
achievements. The decision rule has not been 
discussed although it is crucial because if there is an 
anonym vote, the producers may have some power 
                                                          
1
 The text of the letter was “Information Meeting and debate about 
the proposal of GI Café de Jarabacoa elaborated by the Cluster 
Café de Jarabacoa as strategy of valorisation of the coffee 
produced in the zone” (our underlined). 
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(they are represented by six persons) but if the 
discussion is taken by public vote, it gives an 
advantage to the biggest coffee firm because the 
producers will not dare to oppose to him. Another 
point of discussion was related to the place of the 
meeting. The biggest coffee firm proposed to do it in 
its conference room but the Team succeeded in 
defending the more neutral option of a theatre of the 
university.     
B. The game played and its results  
Step 1. For different reasons linked to the presence 
of CODOCAFE’s Executive Director in Jarabacoa at 
the meeting, the round began with a delay of two 
hours. Very few producers came from Constanza and 
none from Juncalito. They followed the presentation 
performed by the Team (so, they were aware that they 
could join the GI initiative), but they left Jarabacoa 
before the second step (they did not participate to the 
debate).  
 
Figure 2: First and second bests of the traders working 
group
 
Source: Part of the paperboard of the “Traders” working group  
Step 2 was a discussion inside three groups 
(producers, traders, and institutions) about the 
advantages and drawbacks of the different options and 
the preferences of each group (first and second 
choice). The working group “Producers” was 
composed exclusively of producers from the 
Municipio de Jarabacoa (included producers from the 
lower areas). The group was hesitating a lot. The 
president of the Cluster (who is a medium producer 
from the high part of the municipality of Jarabacoa) 
had a great influence on the debate. Finally, the group 
was in favour of strong production norms and of the 
exclusion of the farms below 700-800 m (in spite of 
the protest of the producers from the lower zones who 
were willing to join the GI). It was also in favour of 
the large option (with Juncalito and Constanza). Like 
the producers, the working group “Institutions” was 
very sensitive to the arguments of the Team 
concerning the homogeneity of the coffee in the three 
zones (fruity attribute), the economies of scale that can 
be reached at the level of the large zone (Jarabacoa + 
Juncalito + Constanza), and the will to include as 
much producers as possible. They chose the same first 
best as the producers. On the contrary, the working 
group “Traders” chose as first best to restrict the area 
to the highest part of the municipality of Jarabacoa and 
to adopt restrictive production norms. They hesitated 
for the second best between opening the door to the 
neighbouring zone or to the low areas of Jarabacoa. 
Finally, they chose the second one, a decision which 
was probably conditioned by the opinion of the 
biggest coffee firm of the Jarabacoa region (see figure 
2). 
Step 3 (which should be the restitution of the results 
of the working groups and collective debate) did not 
occur because time was lacking.  
Step 4 was the effective decision-making process. It 
occurred in the afternoon. After the presentation of the 
results of the different working groups (by the 
members of the IDIAF-PROCA2 team who animated 
each group), the participants expressed their position. 
There was a consensus on the question of the 
exclusion of the lower areas and on restrictive 
production norms. The president of the Cluster himself 
defended restrictive norms with the argument that, if 
the price increases sufficiently as effect of the GI, 
everyone would succeed in complying with the norms. 
So, the debate was focused on the question of the 
inclusion of Juncalito and Constanza. Many 
institutions expressed a position in favour of the large 
area whereas the director of the main coffee firm of 
the Jarabacoa region was clearly against the inclusion 
of the neighbouring zones. The discussion was not 
followed by a formal decision (no vote occurred). The 
director of the biggest coffee firm of the Jarabacoa 
region summed up the discussion by the proposal to 
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include neither the neighbouring zones of Juncalito 
and Constanza nor the farms of the Jarabacoa below 
700 m, and to adopt restrictive norms. To reach an 
agreement, he opened the door to a future integration 
of the neighbouring zones, telling that it is better to 
begin with the region of Jarabacoa alone. Nobody 
opposed and this has been interpreted as a decision of 
the Cluster by consensus2. The delimitated and 
excluded areas are represented in figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Delimitated area of the GI (in red) and excluded 
areas (in yellow) 
 
VI. THE SECOND ROUND OF NEGOTIATION 
The second round occurred on March 2007. Its 
objective was to take a decision for the GI production 
norms and to design a classification for the (future) 
certified coffee. Indeed although the general idea of 
restrictive norms has emerged from the first round, a 
more in-dept analysis was necessary for the fine-
tuning of each norm with its control points.  
A. The definition of the rules of the game 
In line with the results of the first round, nobody 
from Constanza, Juncalito or the low part of 
municipality of Jarabacoa were invited. Many persons 
from the delimitated area were invited (either member 
                                                          
2
 It was not so clear for everybody. The president of the Cluster 
told us in June 2007 that he does not know neither if the 
decision has been taken nor what was the decision.  
of the Cluster or not). The organization of the 
discussion and the decision was very simple: only one 
plenary session with all the invited stakeholders. Like 
for the first round, the Team was charged by the 
Cluster to make proposals regarding the productive 
norms and the classification.  For the classification, 
the Team proposed a very classic way to classify green 
coffee beans (by size, number of defect, colour, 
humidity rate, and some cup attributes). Its main 
characteristic was to put very strict criteria for the 
highest level category, the AAA. The proposed 
production norms were elaborated by the Team as a 
mix of some norms from different certification 
schemes general (Eurep-GAP, norms of the 
International Labour Organization) or specific to the 
coffee sector (Fair Trade, Utz Kapeh, Bird Friendly, 
Starbucks, GI Café de Veracruz…). Their main 
characteristic is that they are very restrictive on all the 
aspects of the process that main affect quality. Their 
main originality is that they include social and 
environmental norms (what is very new for GIs). 
Those norms (introduced “to differentiate more the 
product”) were based on the check of many 
certifications but mainly inspired by EurepGap. They 
have not been adapted to the specificities of the social 
and environmental situation of the Jarabacoa region. 
In order to allow a discussion of the norms (and of 
their importance level), the Cluster commissioned a 
field survey the aim of which was to check how far 
current practices followed by farmers complied with 
the norms. The results of this study (based on the 
declarations of 192 farmers) were presented during the 
second round in a very optimistic perspective. For the 
most crucial control points (related to the fertilization, 
percentage of red cherries and time between harvest 
and despulping), the rates of compliance reported by 
the survey were respectively of 61%, 96%, and 76%. 
But a more in-depth analysis of few case studies 
(where the declared practices were verified) showed 
that none of the six producers complied with those 
crucial control points. The fact is that producers are 
often ashamed to say that they do not respect the 
recommendations for quality…  
B. The game played and its results 
The stakeholders who participated were 17 
producers of all types of the Jarabacoa region, the 
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director of the biggest coffee firm of the Jarabacoa 
region and many public institutions. At the beginning 
of the second round, the PROCA2-IDIAF team 
presented the proposal of quality classification, the 
proposed norms, and the results of the field survey 
about their level of compliance. Then, the proposed 
classification was discussed, but few people had 
something to say on a so technical theme. The biggest 
coffee firm argued for less strict criteria for each 
category and he succeeded (especially regarding the 
requirements on bean size). Then, the proposed 
production norms were checked one by the one. 
However, it was very difficult for producers to defend 
less restrictive norms in front of IDIAF and 
CODOCAFE (who for many years were trying to 
convince the producers to apply those norms) and in 
front of the biggest coffee firm of the Jarabacoa region 
(who buy a great part of their coffee). Producers 
would have been ashamed to oppose to quality norms. 
Nobody dared to contest the data of the field survey. 
Nobody dared to speak about this crucial dimension of 
the problem forgotten in the field survey: the costs of 
the norms. The unique person who could oppose to the 
restrictive norms was the president of the Cluster but 
he was convinced that restrictive norms are necessary 
for quality and also that everyone can adapt to the 
norms if the prices are high. The main result of the 
round was the decision to adopt more restrictive norms 
than those proposed by the Team. Indeed, the 
minimum percent of red cherries passed from 95% to 
97% and the maximum time between harvest and 
despulping passed from 12 hours to 8 hours.  
VII. DISCUSSION  
A. The results of the process: effectiveness and 
fairness questioned 
The constitution of a collective property right over a 
collective resource (as it is the geographical name) is a 
process that modifies the individual positions over this 
resource. Many different stages of the local supply 
chain are involved in this process, and many different 
typologies of actors inside each stage. 
As a consequence, the evaluation of the outcome of 
this process must consider the specific point of view 
that is at the basis of the evaluation itself. In the case 
of an evaluation from the point of view of the 
collective interest, the principles that orient this 
evaluation should be made transparent [13]. 
If we assume an evaluation perspective of the GI as 
decommodification tool, oriented by the whole 
economic performance of the coffee system (and not 
only of some specific sector or actor) and to social 
sustainability (that is, giving attention to distributive 
aspects), the result of the collective decision-making 
process in Jarabacoa can be viewed as ineffective and 
unfair. It is ineffective in decommodifying coffee 
because the process of the GI recognition were not 
inserted in a collective and whole strategy for adding 
value to the product and generate an aggregate surplus 
for the local coffee system. Given that the coffee of 
this area does not have an established reputation and it 
is not imitated on the market, automatic positive 
effects from a reduction of unfair products cannot be 
expected. But the GI in this situation could be the 
basis for a “reputation-building” strategy [14].  
Basically the process of GI Pico Duarte coffee 
could manage two different strategic variables, that is 
the volume of production (low and high) and the 
product territorial identity (low and high). As a 
consequence, four different strategic options can be 
envisaged (see table 2).  
Table 2: Strategic options in the GI definition process 
  Product territorial identity 
  Low High 
 
Large 
D 
Mass quality 
market 
 
A 
Niche intermediate market 
(traders, roasters)  
V
o
lu
m
e 
o
f p
ro
du
ct
io
n
 
 
 
Small 
 
C 
GI as standard substitute 
B 
Niche final consumer 
markets (also by means of 
Alternative food networks) 
 
High territorial identity allows for an origin-based 
differentiation, both on niche intermediate markets 
(traders and roasters, also in importing countries) if the 
quantities are large (A-strategy), and on niche final 
consumer markets (also through alternative food 
networks both environmentally or socially-inspired, 
often supported by NGOs) if the quantities are small 
(B-strategy). 
Even with a low territorial identity a coherent 
strategy can be set-up, by means of promotion 
activities (D-strategy). Promotion implies some 
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relevant fixed costs that shall be recovered thanks to 
high volumes. 
The design process of the Pico Duarte Code of 
practice outlined rather a C-type strategy, that is small 
volume (due to the strict territorial and altitude 
delimitations) and a low identity in terms of the link 
with the area of origin in its physical and especially 
anthropic dimensions (no reflection was made on the 
link between the product and the local culture and 
people), even if with reference to standardised quality 
criteria.  
Without economies of scale, as in the case of the C-
strategy, it will not be possible to sufficiently develop 
the required promotion activities. The GI Code of 
practice can act as a reference standard for coffee 
growers and for other local actors, allowing for a 
reduction of costs associated to transactions both 
inside and outside the Jarabacoa local production 
system. 
As a consequence, the ability of the C-strategy in 
generating economic surplus is questioned: expected 
quantities are small, the increase in price is uncertain 
(the increased intrinsic quality could be not easy to 
communicate to purchasers, due to low quantity that 
may undermine promotion), the increase in costs is 
high (due to the restrictive production norms and to 
the few economies of scale on administration, control 
and promotion). 
The result of the process can also be judged as 
unfair according to the criteria of justice proposed by 
John Rawls [11].  
Indeed, the code of practices of the GI excludes 
producers who are similar to included producers in 
violation of the “fair equality of opportunity” 
principle. Indeed, the producers from Juncalito and 
Constanza - the neighbouring regions - have the same 
potential for quality (as demonstrated in IDIAF’s 
study) and the same legitimacy to use the name “Pico 
Duarte” ). Indeed, nobody was using formerly the 
name Pico Duarte in coffee commercial transactions. 
In addition, “Pico Duarte” is not an exclusive 
geographical reference for the Jarabacoa province, but 
it is relevant to all the north slope of the Cordillera 
Central (including Juncalito and Constanza).  
Moreover, the code of practices of the GI also 
excludes the poorest producers (localized below 700 
m), which violates the “difference principle” which 
stipulates that inequalities are fair only if they are “of 
the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members 
of society” [11, , p.303].  
In addition, vertical distribution of the benefits 
doesn’t seem altered with regard to the previous 
situation, where big coffee producers and local 
processors are the powerful actors. Indeed, GI plays 
the role of internal standard instead of opening new 
market opportunities to smaller producers, and its 
contribution in increasing competition in the local 
green coffee market should be questioned. 
This critical assessment of the results of the 
decision-making process leads us to question what 
determined this result. 
B. The key factors in the process 
Many factors explain the final decision on the Pico 
Duarte coffee Code of practice.  
The most important factor is the role of external 
actors and the strength of exogenous logics in the 
process of GI definition. During the first round of the 
debate on the Code of practices, all groups (producers, 
traders, and institutions) chose restrictive options for 
production norms and for the minimum level of 
altitude. This unanimity can be explained by the 
influence of the Team’s presentation which put the 
accent on quality. Although, the aim of the Team was 
to defend the large option (with Juncalito and 
Constanza), maybe it had also the unintentional effect 
to give arguments in favour of the exclusion of the 
farms below 700-800 m (unable to produce fruity 
coffees) and in favour of strong production norms. All 
the more that, according to the data given by the 
Team, the exclusion of the farms below 700-800 m 
would not have affected significantly the quantities 
and the economies of scale (second argument stressed 
by the Team to favour the large option). As a matter of 
fact, the data showed that this exclusion would imply 
the reduction of only 21% of producers and 6% of the 
coffee area (see table 1).  
The strong weight of such scientific data on coffee 
quality can itself be explained by the fantastic 
accumulation of knowledge aggregated in scientific 
instruments (like soil maps, GPS), categories (like the 
definition of what is a coffee producer), procedures 
(like recommendations on good practices for coffee 
cultivation and processing), and norms (like ISO 
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norms which specify how to realize the cup tasting). 
As data from all over the world were centralized and 
accumulated in those instruments, procedures, and 
norms, we can speak of “action at a distance” [15]. For 
this reason, we can say the cognitive framework in 
which the decision making-process was embedded 
was coming from abroad. Maybe for the same reason, 
the consultant who performed the field survey on real 
practices was not able to see the gap between them 
and the recommendations of the coffee manuals and 
presented biased data during the second round. Note 
that this external influence on the cognitive framework 
of design process is not specific to the case of the GI 
Pico Duarte: it always happens when scientific 
instruments, procedures, and norms are used.  
So, the idea that the codes of practices of the GIs 
are locally designed should be questioned even when 
neither external cooperation agencies nor external 
researchers are involved in the process. Moreover, this 
external cognitive influence may also impede the 
design of a specific code of practices. We saw in the 
case of GI Pico Duarte that all production norms 
(included the social and environmental ones) were 
copied from others certifications without adaptation to 
local specificities (the same thing is true for the 
classification norms). The result is a very classical and 
generic code of practice, which does not incorporate 
elements of local culture and knowledge. The 
relevance of such generic GIs to “decommodify” the 
coffee market is doubtful.   
A second explication factor is the empowerment 
unbalances between local actors. The concentration of 
power in the hands of the big trader operating in the 
area influenced the decision process in many ways, 
both in the definition of set of actors participating in 
the process (exclusion of traders of neighbour areas of 
Juncalito and Constanza) and in the contents of the 
Code of practices. In the case of the decision to 
exclude the zones of Juncalito and Constanza, the 
biggest trader opposed to the inclusion in order to 
avoid the competition of others traders (as it will be 
the case in every local coffee supply chain), whereas 
scientific data supported the inclusion. 
Empowerment was relevant also inside the coffee 
growers. Information on GI and on its potential 
function was not spread among all producers, as not 
very clear was the role of the Code of practices. In 
particular, small coffee growers farmers located in 
lower areas, and coffee growers of Juncalito and 
Constanza areas, were not well informed. 
Even the lack of time during the decision process 
(e.g. during the first round to have a collective debate 
based on the work of the different groups) can be 
explained on the basis of the power of some actors in 
establishing the rules for discussion and taking a 
decision. 
A third factor is the weakness of local institutional 
framework. Local public institutions were out of the 
GI process, and they didn’t put in the debate their 
point of view, that outght to be inspired by public 
interest.  
Other elements seem to be more contingent to this 
specific case study and can not be easily generalised. 
For instance, the sequentially of the decision-making 
process played an important role in the decision to 
exclude the lower areas. Indeed, the discussion of the 
delimitation of the GI area occurred during the first 
round before the discussion about the classification of 
green coffee. But with this classification, it would 
have been possible to include the low areas in the GI 
without blending their coffee with the aromatic coffee 
of the high altitude areas.  
Other contingent factors played a decisive role in 
the success of the more restrictive option. The main 
one is the previous existence of the Cluster (with a 
legitimate area of intervention restricted to the 
municipality of Jarabacoa) at the moment of the birth 
of the GI initiative. This played a decisive role in the 
participation of producers from Constanza and 
Juncalito to the first round. Indeed, the current name 
of GI at that time was Café de Jarabacoa what is not 
very attractive for people of the neighbouring zones 
(the coffee production is more recent and less reputed 
in Jarabacoa).  
In brief, although GIs have a potential impact on the 
“decommodification” of the coffee market, this impact 
may be undermined by some external cognitive 
influences (mainly driven by instruments, categories 
and norms) that can lead to a Code of practices too 
specific and not adapted to real characteristics of the 
local production system, and by lack of empowerment 
inside the local production system. Besides, the 
exclusive focus on high quality issues and the 
complete lacking of attention to the governance of the 
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future GI system (including collective management 
issues, possible elaboration of collective commercial 
strategies, control of the compliance of the product 
with the Code of practices) can threaten seriously the 
future performance of the GI Pico Duarte. 
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Geographical indications can give important 
contributions to the decomommodification of the 
coffee market.  
First, GIs can stimulate the developing of the 
product specificities related to the territorial origin of 
the product (terroir). Coffee produced in Jarabacoa 
region had not a reputation of high-quality on the 
market nor a production tradition, having been 
recently introduced, but technical analysis evidenced a 
high quality “potential” ,. In this context GI is not a 
matter of defending a previously acquired reputation 
from abuses. Rather, it is a process of reputation-
building pursued by reaching a quality standard fixed 
locally but according to market requirements. All the 
decisions taken on the Code of practices, and the 
justification brought on for that, refer to a qualification 
project of coffee production in the area. That is why, 
rather than preserving traditional techniques and 
know-how, the rules have rather the aim of changing 
traditional production practices in order to improve 
coffee quality and meet commercial standards. 
The GI application procedure should become a 
collective learning process, where local actors take 
consciousness of the potential qualities and 
specificities of their product, but also of possible 
improvements in their production practices.  
The meaning of the GI can be quite different from 
the European (Mediterranean) one which puts much 
emphasis on the terroir effect as quality 
differentiation, and more inspired by a “standard 
quality” approach, where GI aims at reaching a 
homogeneous and high level of quality on the market 
but with less attention to the human, historical, and 
cultural specificities of coffee quality of the area. The 
same logic of the Pico Duarte case is observable in 
many other GI initiatives on coffees, in Dominican 
Republic and in other producing countries. 
In the coffee global chain GIs can be conceived as a 
way of decommodification which acts by guaranteeing 
buyers and/or roasters both the origin of the coffee and 
its quality and production process, thus reassuring a 
supply of raw material with some stable characteristics 
along time, limiting the need to reformulate their 
blends [16] and reducing the cost of quality controls. 
This can help building a trust-based relationship [17]. 
In this sense, a GI may act as “quality stabilizer” to 
simplify the supply decisions of the roasters and their 
blending process [18].  
The fact that GI can be used to promoting and 
protecting quality more than tipicity can deeply 
influence the GI recognition criteria: less reference to 
tradition and on the effects of terroir on product 
characteristics, more reference to technical evaluation 
of quality and standards. One possible interpretation 
for this special vision relies in the fact that actually the 
very concept of GI has been recently introduced in 
many countries as Dominican Republic and many 
people do not know the meaning of it, and maybe 
interpret it as a quality certification scheme as many 
others, without attaching special values.  
The decommodification potential of GIs can be 
lowered if the GI is exclusively devoted to technical 
specificities and intrinsic quality characteristics. In 
fact, this approach can lead to serious distortions in the 
definition of the GI product, threatening the 
effectiveness of the GI tool. The logic of “reputation-
building strategy based on quality increase” has huge 
consequences on the way the GI will operate, on 
exclusion effects, on marketing initiatives. In general, 
small GIs face serious difficulties to satisfy the 
requests of the downstream actors for logistic reasons 
(for example, the standard unit for exporting coffee is 
the container).  
The characteristics of global commodity supply 
chains, and in particular the disarticulation of 
production process between producing and consuming 
countries, can block the development of GI initiatives 
on green coffee aiming at reaching the final consumer. 
Roasters use blends of coffees to produce a product 
with stable characteristics, and they perceive GIs as a 
menace for their business. As a consequence, a GI 
coffee may face many problems to reach the final 
consumers as “pure origin”. To date reference is very 
often made by roasters to countries of origin or estates, 
or sometimes to imaginary terroirs, thus preserving a 
great deal of room for manoeuvre [10].  
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It is clear that GI projects aiming at reaching the 
end of the supply chain (roasters, wholesalers, final 
consumers) should consider together quality issues 
and distributive issues, building not only a “new” 
identity of the product but also new ways of linking 
the product with buyers (alternative networks). In this 
context, the empowerment of local actors is an 
important point. 
If we consider the distribution of (potential) benefits 
coming from the decommodification (fairness 
implications), it is important to consider GI as a 
collective process aiming at establishing property 
rights on a collective name by a rules codification 
process, transforming the status quo situation. Possible 
conflicts between different logics of the involved 
actors inside the local GI production system may arise. 
GI can be seen both as a quality standard (for local 
processors and traders), or as a marketing tool useful 
to opening new marketing channels and escaping from 
local buyers (for local producers and their 
associations) [19]. 
Very strict norms on the production and processing 
process reduce the number of producers who will be 
able to comply with the norms without too high costs. 
Such a “high-quality” GI may be utilized and useful 
only for the bigger farms and the only processor in the 
area, acting as a “club” network with high entry fees.  
In fact, many doubts on smallholders’ capacity to 
comply with the Code of practices and, more in 
general, to interface their firms with bureaucratic 
burdens (e.g. traceability) emerge. In particular, 
smallholders may encounter stronger adaptation 
problems to GI norms and logic, and hence they 
cannot join it. In addition, very often along the supply 
chain there are strong power unbalances that impede 
smallholders to make use of the GI (e.g. credit 
anticipations by buyers not interested in GI that oblige 
farmers to sell them the product) or to gain the right 
price. Horizontal (between firms at the same stage of 
the supply chain) and vertical (between firms 
belonging to different stages of the supply chain, e.g. 
agriculture and processing) distribution of benefits GI 
can generate is a very important point also for social 
and environmental sustainability. 
The trade-off between high-quality and social 
inclusion seems to be impossible to cope with, at least 
at the beginning of the valorisation process. In this 
direction, if quality is the sole way to follow for 
competing in the market, actions to raise both the 
empowerment and the resources (human, financial, 
technical) of local coffee producers should be 
activated.  
Therefore, the development of all the 
decommodification potential of GI initiatives at local 
level asks for a strong coordination with other policies 
aiming at empowering disadvantaged local actors, 
making easy or possible their access to new forms of 
product valorisation and new income opportunities. A 
coordinated policy at territorial level is a key point for 
their real participation to the building process of the 
GI (education, information …) and for the 
effectiveness of the GI (information, credit, technical 
assistance, access to markets). An important step will 
be the aggregation of small producer in cooperatives 
and/or associations, to increase their bargaining 
power. 
Normally, GI alone cannot provide the solution for 
the product valorisation, in particular when the 
problem to solve is not only the protection from unfair 
imitations. The GI should be integrated in a more 
comprehensive strategy elaborated by local actors in 
order to valorise the product and local resources 
involved in its production process. In this sense GI 
cannot be only a quality scheme, but also a new 
governance tool for localised production systems. 
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